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**PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON  
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES**

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From: 12 July 1950  
TO : 19 July 1950  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army,  
Washington 25, D. C.  
20 July 1950

No. 3.

**1. U.S.S.R. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD**

- a. The Soviet Union is in the advanced stages of preparation for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
- b. Recent indications point to a continuation of Soviet preparedness measures and to an increased condition of readiness, especially in the Balkans and the Near East.
- c. Preparations for an attack on Taiwan appear to be continuing.

**2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD**

- a. Summary.--Chinese Communist troop movements from South China, consisting in part of Korean elements, continue. Troops appear to be destined both for Manchuria and Korea and for the buildup of forces for the invasion of Taiwan. Logistical activity and propaganda in the Balkans indicate possible military action in that area this year. Call-ups of reserve officers in both the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries has occurred but general mobilization is not indicated.
- b. Operations of enemy component elements.
  - (1) KOREA.--See current situation reports. Korean elements of the Chinese Communist Forces are apparently moving to Korea from South China.

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- (2) **CHINA.**-- Continuing movements of Chinese Communist troops northward from Canton are apparently for a further buildup of forces for the invasion of Taiwan, but reliable evidence of any further troop increase immediately opposite Taiwan is lacking. A major Chinese Communist attack on Tibet proper is not indicated in the near future.
  - (3) **INDO-CHINA.**--Despite the continuing lull in activity by Communist forces, large and well-equipped Chinese Communist forces remain deployed on the Tonkin border.
  - (4) **U.S.S.R.**--Soviet reserve officers are being called up for varying periods of service but there is no indication of general Soviet mobilization.
  - (5) **GERMANY-POLAND.**--Soviet military activity has apparently been confined to normal, seasonal maneuvers.
  - (6) **BALKANS-NEAR EAST.**--There is as yet no confirmed movement of Soviet or native forces which would indicate military action in this area to be imminent. Logistical preparations continue, however, and propaganda charging Yugoslavia and Greece with preparing for war has been intensified.
3. See Tab "A", attached.
4. **SOVIET CAPABILITIES.**--No change is indicated in Soviet capabilities in the Far East, but North Korean capabilities would be increased with the arrivals of Korean Troops from South China. There has been no apparent change in Soviet capabilities in Northern Europe and the Balkans since the last report although there are indications of continuing logistical build-up and of training preparations in the Balkans.

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TAB "A"

# ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Proceedings of the IIF Steering Committee, 19 July 1950

## 1. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.

a. Reports have been received of a continuing movement of Chinese Communist troops northward from the Canton area. Reports now indicate that some troops are moving north through Hankow towards North China. Although there is no definite confirmation, these latter troops may be some of the Korean element of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army for deployment to Manchuria and thence to Korea. The total number of Koreans with Lin Piao's forces is not known but has been reported from 15,000 to 50,000. It is estimated that about thirty days would be required to deploy troops from South China to Korea. On this basis from 15,000 to 50,000 Korean troops from South China could reach the combat zone in South Korea early in August.

b. Other troops of the Fourth Field Army which are moving northward are presumably intended for a continuing buildup of forces for an attack on Taiwan. Indications are that the Fourth Field Army is to serve as reinforcements for the invasion of Taiwan to be led by the Third Field Army under the command of Chen Yi. Recent coverage is insufficient to indicate whether more troops have been deployed into the Fukien area immediately opposite Taiwan within the past two weeks, but recent information does indicate continuing work on the preparation of air strips in the area. There have been some recent unconfirmed reports that the invasion of Taiwan is to be launched by late July.

c. There has been a lull in Communist activity in Indo China for the past several weeks since the Viet Minh forces suffered a setback. There is a continuing large deployment of Chinese Communist forces on the Tonkin border, capable of lending active military aid to the Viet Minh. These forces have more equipment than is needed for garrison duties. There was a recent report of Soviet tanks being unloaded at Hainan.

d. Chinese Communist claims that they will take Tibet must be considered in connection with the fact that there are two Tibets: Eastern or Chinese Tibet (consisting of the provinces of Sikang and Tsinghai) and Tibet proper. It is believed that references to the taking of Tibet by military force may refer to Chinese Tibet where attacks by Chinese Communist forces are reported to have occurred in December and February. The invasion of Tibet proper would be a formidable logistical problem involving movement over 16,000 to 19,000 foot passes on any of the three possible routes of ingress.

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e. The Soviet fleet is observing U.N. naval operations in the Far East,

f. From the foregoing it is concluded that:

- (1) Korean elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army are being deployed northward, possibly further to reinforce North Korea.
- (2) There are indications of a continuing buildup for an attack on Taiwan but there is no reliable new evidence that an attack is imminent.
- (3) The reasons for the unusually quiet situation in Indo China cannot be definitely determined but may indicate either preparations for formal military operations or efforts to recover from a recent defeat; or it may be due to causes as yet unknown.
- (4) There are no indications of an imminent attack on Tibet proper and previous Chinese Communist attacks have been on Chinese Tibet, i.e., on the provinces of Sikang and Tsinghai.
- (5) There is no new evidence of a Soviet intent to employ their own forces in overt military operations in the Far East.

## 2. Soviet Intentions in Western Europe and the Balkans.

a. Recent rumors of the call-up of Soviet reserves are supported in part by evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been calling up reserve officers both for periods of refresher training and on longer and perhaps indefinite assignments. There is no reliable evidence, however, that this policy has been accelerated since the outbreak of war in Korea or that a general mobilization is under way. The call-ups of older men are believed to be limited to officers and specialists, which reflects a shortage of personnel in these categories and possibly a further expansion of the Soviet Armed Forces. Rumors of general mobilization of the Eastern European Satellite forces are not substantiated, although there is evidence that these forces are testing their mobilization machinery and calling up reservists for periods of training.

b. There is no evidence of unusual Soviet military activity in Poland, Germany or Austria where normal seasonal maneuvers are being conducted.

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c. There is reliable evidence that the Soviets have demanded that more rolling stock be placed in reserve in Austria, and there are unconfirmed reports in Germany of a railroad alert and a Soviet demand for additional reserves of rolling stock by September.

d. There is continuing evidence that the Soviets are stocking equipment at the Baltic Sea ports in East Germany to be utilized for ship repairs in case of war. These stocks are reported to be unusually large even when compared with German war preparations prior to 1939.

e. The Soviets have appointed a Colonel General as Military Attache to Czechoslovakia. He will be the highest-ranking Soviet Military Attache in the world and the appointment is a highly significant development in the tightening of Soviet control of the Czech Forces.

f. There are no indications of a movement of Soviet troops from the area of central Hungary towards the Yugoslav border. The Hungarians, however, are evacuating "undesirable" elements from the new restricted zone on the Yugoslav border and there is some evidence of preparations for the requisitioning of housing in the border area, reportedly for Russian personnel. Additional barracks construction is under way in Hungary and work is continuing on the construction of air-field runways and underground storage depots for gasoline.

g. Continuing rumors of the movement of Soviet and native troops in Rumania and Bulgaria are as yet unconfirmed except for maneuver purposes, and there continues to be no firm evidence of the increased deployment of Bulgarian troops on the borders of Greece or Turkey. The previously reported movements of military equipment and gasoline into Bulgaria and Albania remains the best evidence of unusual military preparations in those countries.

h. An alleged plan for a Bulgarian attack on Turkey has been received, the reliability of which is not known though certain discrepancies cast doubt on its authenticity. The purported objective of the plan is to seize the Dardanelles and Istanbul in five days, utilizing Bulgarian ground forces supported by Soviet warships in the Black Sea flying the Bulgarian flag. The preparations were allegedly to have been completed by 23 June for implementation at an unspecified future date.



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j. There has been a marked intensification, since 1 July, of Communist propaganda against Greece and Yugoslavia, including specific charges that those countries are preparing to attack Albania and Bulgaria at the instigation of the United States, which would tend to justify, in the minds of the natives of these countries, operations against Greece and Yugoslavia. The propaganda has charged that the new theater of war is intended to compensate for American defeat in the Far East and draw the allies of the U.S.S.R. into war in the Balkans.

k. It is concluded that:

- (1) There are no indications of imminent hostilities against Western Europe but there are continuing indications of preparations for such action.
- (2) There are a greater number of indications of preparations in the Balkans, particularly logistical activity and propaganda, which may indicate an intent to precipitate hostilities in that area during 1950.
- (3) An attack in either of these areas could occur without any additional warning.

### 3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. Soviet propaganda since the outbreak of war in Korea has generally been devoted to the theme that millions of peace-loving people the world over will foil the attempts of the warmongers to instigate world war now, although the intent of Western "aggression" in Korea and China is an ultimate attack on the U.S.S.R. The U. S. Embassy in Moscow reports that it finds little evidence in recent Soviet propaganda to indicate that the Soviet people are being led to believe that there is either an immediate threat to the U.S.S.R. or that Soviet forces will be used for offense. Two reports of questionable reliability have been received from outside the U.S.S.R. indicating that the Soviets are waiting for winter to launch World War III.

b. A Cominform meeting is apparently now under way in Berlin. In the Far East, representatives of the Soviet Politburo, the Chinese Communists, and the North Korean government reportedly have been attending a special meeting at either Peiping or Vladivostok.

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